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Japan's Recessions
The recession and sluggish growth that have
marked the u.s. economy for the last eighteen
months have heightened efforts to understand
cyclical behavior. Onepotentiallyfruitful approach
involves comparing business cycles in the u.s.
with those abroad. By highlighting similarities
and contrasts in cyclical behavior, such a com-
parison may help identify factors that may be
particularly important in influencing business
cycles.
This Weekly Letter compares recessions in Japan
to those in the u.s. and looks at some factors that
may explain why Japan's recessions appear to be
less severe. Aside from shedding light on possible
sources of business cycles, the comparison is of
interest because the u.s. and japanese economies
are now highly interdependent, so that cyclical
developments in Japan can affect u.s. economic
performance.
economy in the early 1970s: the growth rate for
59:Ql-71:Q4 (9.9 percent) is used as the baseline
for the first three Japanese recessions, and the
growth rate for 72:Ql-89:Q4 (4.2 percent) is
used as the baseline for the next four recessions.
The baseline for the u.s. (3.1 percent) is not split,
because recent research shows that there was no
statistically significant break in the growth of u.s.
GNP in the postwar period.
Inspection of the charts reveals a number of strik-
ing contrasts between recessions in Japan and
the u.s. First, recessions are more frequent in
Japan than they are in the u.s. and they last
longer. japan experienced seven recessions
between 1959:Q1 and 1989:Q4, while the u.s.
experienced five. Over the sample period, jap-
anese recessions have lasted nearly six quarters
on average, whereas u.s. recessions have lasted
less than four.
Milder recessions in Japan
Charts 1 and 2 present two ways of looking at
GNP growth in the u.s. and Japan during reces-
sions. Recessions in both the u.s. and Japan are
defined as the periods between business cycle
peaks and troughs, as measured by a set of eco-
nomic indicators. Chart 1 compares the com-
pound annual growth rate of GNp, whileChart 2
compares how much GNP growth deviates from
its baseline. The baseline for Japan had to be split
because research indicates that there was a per-
manent decline in the average growth rate of its
Second, recessions are much less severe (as
measured by GNP growth) in Japan than they
are in the u.s. Except for the downturn after the
first oil shock of 1973, recessions in japan have
been associated with positive GNP growth rates
that would not be considered recessionary in the
u.s. GNP growth during recessions in Japan
averaged 5.3 percent prior to 1972 and 2.2 per-
cent subsequently (Chart 1a). In contrast, in the
U.S., all recessions except one have been asso-
ciated with declines in GNP that averaged 2.8
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account for the informal definition of a u.s. re-
cession as two successive quarters of negative
GNP growth.
flexible compensation arrangements, (2) more sta-
ble employment during recessions, and (3) more
stable financing arrangements.
However, looking simply at GNP growth during
recessions may be misleading. Japan's economy
has grown much faster than the u.s. economy on
average over the past 30 years, so Japan's GNP
growth might fall a lot during recessions and still
remain positive. This can be taken into account
by measuring how much GNP declines during
recessions in comparison to an average or bench-
mark rate of growth. Such a measure, provided in
Charts 2a and 2b, also suggests that recessions in
Japan are less severe than in the u.s. Real GNP
growth during recessions on average drops 48
percent below the baseline in Japan (Chart 2a),
compared to a 170 percent drop in the u.s.
(Chart 2b).
To identify the possible causes for the more mod-
erate downturns in Japan, I compared the growth
in real consumption and real fixed investment
(two important components of GNP) in both
economies during recessions to their respective
baseline growth rates. The comparison suggests
that Japanese GNP growth is more stable during
recessions because of greater stability in both
consumption and investment spending. Real
consumption growth in Japan on average falls
45 percent below baseline during recessions,
whereas it falls 94 percent in the u.s. Total fixed
investment inJapan declines 135 percent below
baseline, while non-residential fixed investment
in the u.s. declines 457 percent.
The greater stability ofJapanese GNP growth
during recessio(1s is consistent with three struc-
tural features of the Japanese economy: (1) more
Flexible compensation
Oneremarkable characteristic ofJapanese labor
markets is the importance of large bonuses in to-
tal compensation. These bonuses, which are paid
twice yearly, account for over a quarter of total
compensation (about 31J2 months of base pay on
average in the 1980s), and decline during reces-
sions (Freeman and Weitzman (1987)). Theory
suggests that such flexibility may contribute to
the greater output stability of the Japanese econ-
omy during recessions. If compensation falls in
response to declining demand, as in Japan, the
associated declines in prices will tend to offset
the initial declines in demand. In contrast, if
compensation is more rigid, as it appears to be
in the U.s., producers will be unable to lower
prices in order to offset declining demand. It
should be noted, however, that some Japanese
researchers believe that the downward flexibility
in compensation arrangements is at times over-
stated. For example, Japanese unions significantly
drove up their total compensation during the re-
cessions that followed the first oil shock in 1973.
Stable employment
It is well known that large Japanese employers
adopt policies of "lifetime employment:' which
means that companies commit themselves not to
layoff workers until they retire. Such an arrange-
ment is feasible partly because of flexible com-
pensation arrangements and because overtime
is extensively used and is cut back during reces-
sions. During recessions, Japanese workers expe-
rience a temporary loss of income (lower bonuses
and overtime), but keep their jobs and are morecertain of their permanent income prospects. In
contrast, U.S. workers who are laid off during
recessions face greater uncertainty about their
income prospects. The lower uncertainty about
permanent income may stabilize the consump-
tion of Japanese households during recessions,
in comparison to U.s. households. In this man-
ner, lifetime employment arrangements may
stabilize Japanese GNP during recessions.
The importance of lifetime employment arrange-
ments in dampening recessions is unclear. On
the one hand, only a small proportion of the
labor force is explicitly covered by lifetime em-
ployment arrangements (Freeman and Weitzman
(1987)). On the other hand, long-term commit-
ments appear to be a characteristic of the rela-
tionship ofJapanese businesses with employees,
even when workers are not explicitly covered by
Iifetime employment arrangements.
However, informal examination of the data sug-
gests that these institutional arrangements indeed
have tended to stabilize employment in Japan.
On average, declines in employment during re-
cessions in Japan have been much smaller than
in the U.s., respectively 32 percent and 146 per-
cent below baseline. Also, employment does
not always decline during recessions in Japan,
whereas it consistently does so in the U.S.
Stable financing
It is well known that major Japanese firms rely
heavily on bank financing (see FRBSF Weekly
Letter, 3/29/91), and that their banks are inti-
mately familiar with their corporate strategy and
operations. For example, Japanese banks hold
equity in the firms they lend to and are repre-
sented on the boards of these firms. As a result,
Japanese banks appear to be relatively unper-
turbed by short-term setbacks in the earnings
performance oftheir borrowers, which may make
it easier for Japanese firms to raise funds during
recessions. This contributes to greater stability in
investment spending during recessions in Japan.
In contrast, U.s. firms appear to have a more dis-
tant relationship with their creditors, which may
mean that they find it more difficult than their
Japanese counterparts to raise funds during
recessions and to avoid sharp reductions in in-
vestment spending. For example, U.s. firms tend
to raise a larger proportion offunds in the open
market. Creditors in the open market are less
familiar with long-term strategy or day-to-day
operations ofthe firms they lend to than are banks.
This lack of familiarity may prompt them to react
more sharply to short-term fluctuations in earn-
ings, for example, by changing the interest rates
charged or withdrawing credit. Furthermore, U.s.
firms' relationships with their banks appear to be
more distant than that between Japanese firms
and banks. U.S. banks typically do not hold sig-
nificant amounts of equity or have representatives
on the boards of firms they lend to, as in Japan.
The hypothesis that differences in funding ar-
rangements affect investment is supported by an
analysis ofJapanese data by Hoshi, Kashyap, and
Scharfstein (1991). These authors find that invest-
ment is much less sensitive to a firm's cash flow
position when a firm has close ties to a bank
than when a firm does not enjoy such a close
relationship.
Conclusion
The analysis here suggests that flexible \Nages,
more stable employment, and more stable
financing in Japan have moderated the impact
of recessions on Japanese GNP by stabilizing
consumption and investment spending during
cyclical downturns. However, the explanations
for milder recessions offered in this Weekly Letter
are not exhaustive. The behavior of inventories,
and the impact of government policies need to
be examined carefully to provide a fuller assess-
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